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Abstract 
CEO compensation considerations have gained prominence in recent times, especially in 
the wake of the subprime turmoil. Using cross-section data on Indian manufacturing 
firms for 2007, the paper explores the association between executive compensation and 
firm performance and concludes that pay for performance sensitivity estimates are 
significant although small in magnitude. 
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1. Introduction 
 CEO compensation is an issue which has been widely discussed and 
debated in the US corporate world. More recently, the subprime episode in the US 
has diverted attention towards the compensation excesses to US executives, 
including banks. This was clearly elucidated by the Bank for International 
Settlements (2009), wherein it observed the following:  
Compensation schemes further encouraged managers to forsake long-run prospects for 
short-run return. In some cases, profits calculated with complex mathematical models 
were used to determine rewards even when markets for the assets underlying the 
calculations did not exist and so they could not be sold. Equity holders (because of 
limited liability) and asset managers (because of their compensation system) were unduly 
rewarded for risk-taking: they received a portion of the upside, but the downside 
belonged to the creditors (or the government!)… The result was herding that caused 
arbitrage to fail. In the end, the overall difficulty in distinguishing luck from skill in the 
performance of asset managers, combined with compensation based at least in part on the 
volume of business, encouraged managers and traders to accumulate huge amounts of 
risk (BIS Annual Report, 2009, p.8). 
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In this context, the article briefly reviews the extant literature and explores 
the association between executive compensation and firm performance in India. 
The reminder of the analysis proceeds as follows. An overview of the relevant 
literature is followed by the estimation strategy and summary hypothesis. The 
penultimate section discusses the results followed by the concluding remarks.  
 
2. Executive compensation models 
 The problem of how best to compensate the executive is a classic 
application of the principal-agent theory. In this setup, the collection of owner-
shareholders (the principal) desires the executive (the agent) to maximize 
shareholder value, but cannot explicitly evaluate the executive’s reaction function. 
Central to the problem is the fact that the goals of the executive may be at 
variance with those of shareholders. For instance, a manager may be more 
interested in amassing and defending personal power rather than pursuing profit-
maximizing strategies (see, for example, Bebchuk and Fried, 2003).  
 Jensen and Murphy (1990) conducted an early empirical examination of 
the pay-performance sensitivity with the objective of testing the predictions of 
agency theory. The study estimated the total effect of incentive mechanisms, 
including performance-based salary and bonuses, stock ownership and threat of 
dismissal. The baseline representation of the model is:  
πbaw +=                                                                                                                       (1) 
where w is total executive compensation, a is the guarantee (or safe) component 
of compensation and b is the sensitivity of compensation to performance, π being 
the firm performance measure. Jensen and Murphy (1990) found that, although a 
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positive statistical relationship existed between firm performance and executive 
pay (i.e., b>0), the total pay-for-performance sensitivity was, at best, limited.  
 Garen (1994) took issue with this conjecture, noting that the optimal value 
of b varies by firm and accordingly, an aggregate measure of this variable will 
yield value that are biased downwards. Specifically, Garen (1994) considered a 
standard example when the executive has the utility function U=-exp[-ρ(wkμ2)]/ρ, 
where ρ is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, and μ is the mean of the 
random normally-distributed π, and k is the curvature of the executive’s disutility 
of effort. In this case, the optimal b is given by expression (2) according as:  
12 )1( −+= σρkb                                                                                                            (2) 
where σ2 is the variance of π. By substituting plausible values for the model 
parameters, Garen (1994) illustrated that Jensen and Murphy (1990) estimates 
may indeed be consistent with agency theory.  
Owing to the fact that the optimal values of b vary greatly with functional 
form and other standard assumptions, research suggested that a more appropriate 
test of agency theory would be to construct an optimal contract model and derive 
the comparative static predictions for b. In a key extension of Jensen and Murphy 
(1990), this optimal contract took on board the effect of the risk associated with 
such contracts when executives are risk averse. This is a clear outcome of (2), 
where b is an inverse function of both the level of risk aversion and the risk of 
performance measure.  
 Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) exploited these results to develop a linear 
approximation of the optimal contract. Executive compensation was regressed on 
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firm performance, the variance of firm performance, the interaction between firm 
performance and its variance and a set of dummy variables. In this specification, 
the median pay-for-performance sensitivity (i.e., median value of b) was found to 
be US $14.5 per US $1000 of shareholder value.  
 While work on this aspect as been underway in the Western literature, 
limited research has been forthcoming on this aspect in the Indian context for two 
main reasons. First, until recently, corporate balance sheets were exceedingly 
opaque with limited information being provided on executive compensation. 
Second and more importantly, the accounting irregularities in the US and 
elsewhere have heightened the awareness about optimally designing board 
structures and executive compensation to ameliorate the agency problems 
between management and stakeholders. These developments have, as a 
consequence, prompted the need for greater transparency in the annual accounts 
of corporate entities.  In one of the early studies, Sen and Sarkar (1996) examined 
the intra- and inter-firm differences in managerial characteristics (such as age, 
experience, qualification and remuneration) for large firms. The evidence 
suggested the existence of a tournament structure (increasing pay differentials in 
hierarchies) of salaries and an increase in mean age as one graduates upwards 
along the hierarchy. The study was, however, confined to a small number of firms 
for the year 1990-91, coinciding with the onset of reforms, which limited the 
empirical appeal of the model. Subsequently, two studies, Ghosh (2006) and 
Parthasarathy et al. (2006) have attempted to examine this aspect in some detail. 
The former exploits cross-sectional time series data for 1997-2002 and finds CEO 
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compensation to be significantly and positively affected by firm return on asset, 
CEO chairmanship, CEO age and years of education and R & D intensity. The 
latter, on the other hand, utilizes cross-sectional data for 2005 and finds CEOs, 
who are promoters (owners) receive higher pay.  
 
 
3. Data and methods  
 We base our analysis on the Prowess database, generated and maintained 
by the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE) and after filtering, we 
have a maximum of 324 firms.1  
Specifically, for executive i in firm j, we estimate the following equation 
using OLS methodology: 
          ijjjjjoij Controlsw ϖαηαπσαπαα +++++= ][43221                                            (3) 
with the pay for performance sensitivity being given by (4) according as: 
          bw jjij ≡+=∂∂ ][/ 221 σααπ                                                                                             (4) 
where w is compensation, π is firm performance and σ is the standard 
deviation of firm performance. From agency theory and (1) and (2), we expect 
α1>0 and α2<0. Additionally, following Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), we 
include a stock price variance term (η2) not interacted with firm performance to 
control for any relationship that might exist between compensation and variance 
in firm returns beyond the pay-performance sensitivity.  
                                                 
1 The composition of the sample is as follows. 38 firms (food and beverages), 39 (textiles), 41 
(chemicals), 44 (metal and metal products), 16 (automobiles), 21 (auto ancillaries), 20 (rubber and 
plastic), 27 (electronics), 44 (electrical and machinery) 11 (paper and wood) and 10 (Others). 
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The dependent variable in the specification is total executive 
compensation, defined as the aggregate of salary and other perquisites paid to the 
CEO/Managing Director of the company.  
We consider two firm performance measures: Return on Asset (RoA) and 
Market to book value ratio (MBVR). The former is an accounting and the latter is 
a market-based measure of performance.  
Among the firm-specific controls, we employ firm size and leverage; 
evidence suggests that the level of compensation is usually correlated with these 
variables. In addition, we include dummies to account for firm ownership 
category. Sample firms belong to four ownership categories: business group 
entities (Group) comprising 65% of the sample, stand-alone private firms 
(Indian), accounting for 21% of the sample, foreign private firms (foreign) - 8% 
of the sample and the remaining firms being in the State domain (state). Finally, 
we include dummies to account for the type of industry.  
[Table 1 about here] 
 
4. Results and discussion 
Table 2 presents the regression results with the alternate measures of firm 
performance detailed above. In the first specification (Model 1), the coefficient on 
firm performance and its interaction with performance variance have highly 
statistically significant coefficients signs that are consistent with the expectations 
of agency theory. In terms of magnitudes, the sensitivity for CEO pay-for-
performance is 0.032, which is statistically significant at 0.01 level.  
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Among the control variables, the relation between firm size and executive 
pay is positive and significant, as hypothesized by Garen (1994). The sign on 
Leverage is not significant at conventional levels, suggesting that debt pressure 
does not exert any disciplinary influence on pay. Finally, all the ownership 
dummies are consistently significant across all specifications, which suggest that 
CEO remuneration is typically higher across firms in these ownership groups vis-
à-vis state-owned firms (the omitted category).  
In the second specification, we include a dummy variable to ascertain if 
institutional shareholding exerts any perceptible influence CEO pay. More 
specifically, the variable Dy_banker is a dummy, which equals one if a firm has a 
banker on its board, either from a commercial bank or from a financial institution. 
If nominee directors, being representatives of institutional shareholders and 
creditors, exert a dampening influence on CEO pay, the coefficient on this 
variable would be negative. Looking at Col. (2), the coefficient on this variable is 
not significant.  
The riskiness of the firm’s investment opportunity set could have a 
bearing on CEO pay (Garen, 1994). In particular, firms with high R&D intensity 
could stand to benefit if the project fructifies, and therefore, entail higher CEO 
pay. To examine this possibility, we include the R&D/Asset ratio as an 
explanatory variable in the baseline specification.  Looking at the coefficient on 
this variable, the results indicate that the coefficient on this variable is positive 
and significant at 0.10 level.  
 [Table 2 about here] 
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5. Concluding remarks 
The literature on executive compensation in India is limited. Using data on 
manufacturing firms, the paper demonstrates that pay-performance sensitivity 
estimates are significant with signs predicted by agency theory. We also test the 
Jensen-Murphy (1990) proposition which supports the fact that there exists a 
relationship between variance in firm returns and the sensitivity of executive pay 
to firm performance.  
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Table 1: Definition and Summary Statistics 
Variable Definition  Mean Median Max 
Remun Aggregate of salary and other perquisites 
adjusted for inflation (in 000s) 
99.495 43.597 1982.818 
Π Firm performance, defined as RoA (=net 
profit/Asset) 
9.348 7.240 34.158 
η Standard deviation in daily closing stock price 
over the year 
83.309 24.610 1046.35 
Size Natural logarithm of real sales 1.394 1.389 7.602 
Age Natural logarithm of number of years since firm 
incorporation 
1.432 1.410 3.300 
Debt Borrowing/total asset 30.948 30.500 226.210 
Group Dummy =1, if a firm belongs to business group, 
else zero 
0.575 1 1 
Indian Dummy =1, if a firm is Indian private, else zero 0.322 0 1 
Foreign Dummy =1, if a firm is foreign, else zero 0.069 0 1 
State Dummy =1, if a firm is state-owned, else zero 0.033 0 1 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Executive compensation regression results 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept  7.677 (0.322)*** 7.627 (0.353)*** 7.708 (0.375)*** 
Performance 0.032 (0.012)*** 0.034 (0.012)** 0.034 (0.012)*** 
Performance*Variance -0.00009(0.00004)*** -0.00009(0.00003)*** -0.00009(0.00003)** 
Stock price variance 0.0001 (0.002) 0.0002 (0.032) 0.0001 (0.001) 
Size  0.298 (0.064)*** 0.305 (0.060)*** 0.304 (0.074)*** 
Leverage -0.005 (0.003) -0.004 (0.004) -0.004 (0.003) 
Dy_banker  0.192 (0.257)  
R&D/Asset   0.119 (0.066)* 
Ownership dummies    
Group 2.688 (0.231)*** 2.669 (0.287)*** 2.592 (0.285)*** 
Indian 2.072 (0.297)*** 2.099 (0.322)*** 1.946 (0.344)*** 
Foreign 2.630 (0.382)*** 2.472 (0.378)*** 2.546 (0.404)*** 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 324 324 324 
Pseudo R-square 0.266 0.269 0.277 
Standard errors within brackets 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively 
